caa a22 4500 605475873 CHVBK 20210128100353.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150801xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-014-0857-4 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0857-4 Collateral and the efficiency of monetary policy [Elektronische Daten] [M. Peiris, Alexandros Vardoulakis] This paper argues that in a monetary Real Business Cycle economy where a complete set of nominal contingent claims exist, the requirement to collateralize loans, alone, does not affect the equilibrium allocation when monetary policy is chosen optimally: The Pareto optimal allocation can be supported. A Friedman rule (r=0), which would be optimal in the absence of collateral constraints, here is not. At the resulting prices, collateral constraints bind and the allocation is inefficient. However, positive interest rates (through an inflation tax on money balances) support the Pareto optimal allocation when the collateral constraint binds. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg (Outside the USA), 2015 Monetary policy nationallicence Inflation nationallicence Collateral nationallicence Peiris M. ICEF, NRU-Higher School of Economics, 26 Shabolovka Ulitsa, Moscow, Russian Federation aut Vardoulakis Alexandros Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Constitution Ave NW, Washington, DC, USA aut Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 59/3(2015-08-01), 579-603 0938-2259 59:3<579 2015 59 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0857-4 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0857-4 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Peiris M. ICEF, NRU-Higher School of Economics, 26 Shabolovka Ulitsa, Moscow, Russian Federation aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Vardoulakis Alexandros Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Constitution Ave NW, Washington, DC, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 59/3(2015-08-01), 579-603 0938-2259 59:3<579 2015 59 199