caa a22 4500 605475903 CHVBK 20210128100354.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150801xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-014-0851-x doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0851-x Pancs Romans Department of Economics, University of Rochester, 14627, Rochester, NY, USA aut Efficient dark markets [Elektronische Daten] [Romans Pancs] This paper studies a standard dynamic trading environment with asymmetric information. A trading mechanism, called a dark market, is proposed that achieves allocative efficiency (i.e., maximizes the total surplus). The mechanism's critical feature is that it conceals from traders the history of past trades. Under plausible conditions, the dark market is stable (i.e., impervious to non-conforming trades offered by an entrant market-maker). Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 Dark markets nationallicence Efficiency nationallicence Stability nationallicence Information disclosure nationallicence Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 59/3(2015-08-01), 605-624 0938-2259 59:3<605 2015 59 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0851-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0851-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Pancs Romans Department of Economics, University of Rochester, 14627, Rochester, NY, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 59/3(2015-08-01), 605-624 0938-2259 59:3<605 2015 59 199