caa a22 4500 605475911 CHVBK 20210128100354.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-014-0852-9 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0852-9 Procedural fairness and redistributive proportional tax [Elektronische Daten] [P. Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski] We study the implications of procedural fairness on the share of income that should be redistributed. We formulate procedural fairness as a particular non-cooperative bargaining game and examine the stationary subgame perfect equilibria of the game. The equilibrium outcome is called tax equilibrium and is shown to be unique. The procedurally fair tax rate is defined as the tax rate that results in the limit of tax equilibria when the probability that negotiations break down converges to zero. The procedurally fair tax rate is shown to be unique. We also provide a characterization of the procedurally fair tax rate that involves the probability mass of below average income citizens and a particular measure of the citizens' boldness. This characterization is then used to show that in a number of interesting cases, the procedurally fair tax rate equals the probability mass of below average income citizens. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 Procedural fairness nationallicence Tax rate nationallicence Bargaining nationallicence Herings P. Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands aut Predtetchinski Arkadi Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands aut Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 59/2(2015-06-01), 333-354 0938-2259 59:2<333 2015 59 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0852-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0852-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Herings P. Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Predtetchinski Arkadi Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 59/2(2015-06-01), 333-354 0938-2259 59:2<333 2015 59 199