Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s00199-014-0853-8 |2 doi |
| 035 | |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0853-8 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Lebrun |D Bernard |u Department of Economics, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Bernard Lebrun] |
| 520 | 3 | |a With two bidders, one strong and one weak, the introduction of at least some degree of anonymous "pay-your-bid” in the payment rule of the second-price auction behoves any risk-neutral seller who, while possibly efficiency minded, cares about revenues. This can be achieved by adding to the winner's payment a uniform proportion of his own bid, as in Güth and van Damme's auction, or by having bidders receive a uniform proportion of the losing bid, as in Goeree and Offerman's Amsterdam auction, or even by selling uniform toeholds to the bidders prior to the auction. We demonstrate one-to-one relations between the equilibria of these auctions and of first-price auctions. By assuming a power relation between the bidders' value cumulative or decumulative functions, we obtain explicit expressions for the first-order effects of the pay-your-bid rule. | |
| 540 | |a Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a Second-price auction |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a First-price auction |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a English auction |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a 2-k-price auction |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Amsterdam auction |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Bidder heterogeneity |2 nationallicence | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 59/2(2015-06-01), 245-275 |x 0938-2259 |q 59:2<245 |1 2015 |2 59 |o 199 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0853-8 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI |
| 898 | |a BK010053 |b XK010053 |c XK010000 | ||
| 900 | 7 | |a Metadata rights reserved |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence |2 nationallicence | |
| 908 | |D 1 |a research-article |2 jats | ||
| 949 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |F NATIONALLICENCE |b NL-springer | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0853-8 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 100 |E 1- |a Lebrun |D Bernard |u Department of Economics, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 59/2(2015-06-01), 245-275 |x 0938-2259 |q 59:2<245 |1 2015 |2 59 |o 199 | ||