caa a22 4500 60547592X CHVBK 20210128100354.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-014-0853-8 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0853-8 Lebrun Bernard Department of Economics, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada aut Revenue-superior variants of the second-price auction [Elektronische Daten] [Bernard Lebrun] With two bidders, one strong and one weak, the introduction of at least some degree of anonymous "pay-your-bid” in the payment rule of the second-price auction behoves any risk-neutral seller who, while possibly efficiency minded, cares about revenues. This can be achieved by adding to the winner's payment a uniform proportion of his own bid, as in Güth and van Damme's auction, or by having bidders receive a uniform proportion of the losing bid, as in Goeree and Offerman's Amsterdam auction, or even by selling uniform toeholds to the bidders prior to the auction. We demonstrate one-to-one relations between the equilibria of these auctions and of first-price auctions. By assuming a power relation between the bidders' value cumulative or decumulative functions, we obtain explicit expressions for the first-order effects of the pay-your-bid rule. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 Second-price auction nationallicence First-price auction nationallicence English auction nationallicence 2-k-price auction nationallicence Amsterdam auction nationallicence Bidder heterogeneity nationallicence Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 59/2(2015-06-01), 245-275 0938-2259 59:2<245 2015 59 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0853-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0853-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Lebrun Bernard Department of Economics, York University, Toronto, ON, Canada aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 59/2(2015-06-01), 245-275 0938-2259 59:2<245 2015 59 199