Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s00199-014-0838-7 |2 doi |
| 035 | |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0838-7 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Shi |D Fei |u Department of Economics, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Fa Hua Zhen Road 535, 200052, Shanghai, People's Republic of China |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Fei Shi] |
| 520 | 3 | |a We develop a two-stage, two-location model to investigate long-run technology choice with endogenous capacity constraints. Rational managers determine the maximum capacities (and mobility constraints). Then, boundedly rational agents play a coordination game with the possibility to migrate. We consider two alternative strategy sets and two different objective functions for the managers and show that they affect the long-run technology choice in a non-trivial way. If the managers only care about efficiency in their respective locations, either coexistence of conventions or global coordination on the risk-dominant equilibrium will be selected, depending on the (effective) capacities of both locations. If they are concerned with scale and can choose mobility constraints, global coordination on the risk-dominant equilibrium without mobility will be selected in the long run. We then change the basic interaction to a $$n\times n$$ n × n pure coordination game where mis-coordination results in zero payoff, and show that, regardless of the constraint choices, all the agents will coordinate on the most efficient equilibrium. | |
| 540 | |a Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a Location models |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Long-run technology choice |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Stochastic learning |2 nationallicence | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 59/2(2015-06-01), 377-399 |x 0938-2259 |q 59:2<377 |1 2015 |2 59 |o 199 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0838-7 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI |
| 898 | |a BK010053 |b XK010053 |c XK010000 | ||
| 900 | 7 | |a Metadata rights reserved |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence |2 nationallicence | |
| 908 | |D 1 |a research-article |2 jats | ||
| 949 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |F NATIONALLICENCE |b NL-springer | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0838-7 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 100 |E 1- |a Shi |D Fei |u Department of Economics, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Fa Hua Zhen Road 535, 200052, Shanghai, People's Republic of China |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Economic Theory |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 59/2(2015-06-01), 377-399 |x 0938-2259 |q 59:2<377 |1 2015 |2 59 |o 199 | ||