<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">
 <record>
  <leader>     caa a22        4500</leader>
  <controlfield tag="001">605475954</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="003">CHVBK</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="005">20210128100354.0</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="007">cr unu---uuuuu</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="008">210128e20150601xx      s     000 0 eng  </controlfield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">10.1007/s00199-014-0838-7</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">(NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0838-7</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Shi</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Fei</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Department of Economics, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Fa Hua Zhen Road 535, 200052, Shanghai, People's Republic of China</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Long-run technology choice with endogenous local capacity</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[Fei Shi]</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">We develop a two-stage, two-location model to investigate long-run technology choice with endogenous capacity constraints. Rational managers determine the maximum capacities (and mobility constraints). Then, boundedly rational agents play a coordination game with the possibility to migrate. We consider two alternative strategy sets and two different objective functions for the managers and show that they affect the long-run technology choice in a non-trivial way. If the managers only care about efficiency in their respective locations, either coexistence of conventions or global coordination on the risk-dominant equilibrium will be selected, depending on the (effective) capacities of both locations. If they are concerned with scale and can choose mobility constraints, global coordination on the risk-dominant equilibrium without mobility will be selected in the long run. We then change the basic interaction to a $$n\times n$$ n × n pure coordination game where mis-coordination results in zero payoff, and show that, regardless of the constraint choices, all the agents will coordinate on the most efficient equilibrium.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Location models</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Long-run technology choice</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Stochastic learning</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="t">Economic Theory</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer Berlin Heidelberg</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">59/2(2015-06-01), 377-399</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0938-2259</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">59:2&lt;377</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2015</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">59</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">199</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0838-7</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="898" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">BK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">XK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">XK010000</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="900" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Metadata rights reserved</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">Springer special CC-BY-NC licence</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="908" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="D">1</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">research-article</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">jats</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="949" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="F">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">NL-springer</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">856</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">40</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0838-7</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">100</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Shi</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Fei</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Department of Economics, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Fa Hua Zhen Road 535, 200052, Shanghai, People's Republic of China</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">773</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">0-</subfield>
   <subfield code="t">Economic Theory</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer Berlin Heidelberg</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">59/2(2015-06-01), 377-399</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0938-2259</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">59:2&lt;377</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2015</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">59</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">199</subfield>
  </datafield>
 </record>
</collection>
