Further results on essential Nash equilibria in normal-form games

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Economic Theory, 59/2(2015-06-01), 277-300
Format:
Artikel (online)
ID: 605475962
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024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s00199-014-0829-8  |2 doi 
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100 1 |a Carbonell-Nicolau  |D Oriol  |u Department of Economics, Rutgers University, 75 Hamilton Street, 08901, New Brunswick, NJ, USA  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Further results on essential Nash equilibria in normal-form games  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau] 
520 3 |a A Nash equilibrium $$x$$ x of a normal-form game $$G$$ G is essential if any perturbation of $$G$$ G has an equilibrium close to $$x$$ x . Using payoff perturbations, we identify a new collection of games containing a dense, residual subset of games whose Nash equilibria are all essential. This collection covers economic examples that cannot be handled by extant results and subsumes the sets of games considered in the literature. 
540 |a Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 
690 7 |a Infinite normal-form game  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Equilibrium refinement  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Essential equilibrium  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Equilibrium existence  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Continuous security  |2 nationallicence 
773 0 |t Economic Theory  |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg  |g 59/2(2015-06-01), 277-300  |x 0938-2259  |q 59:2<277  |1 2015  |2 59  |o 199 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0829-8  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
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900 7 |a Metadata rights reserved  |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence  |2 nationallicence 
908 |D 1  |a research-article  |2 jats 
949 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |F NATIONALLICENCE  |b NL-springer 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 856  |E 40  |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0829-8  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 100  |E 1-  |a Carbonell-Nicolau  |D Oriol  |u Department of Economics, Rutgers University, 75 Hamilton Street, 08901, New Brunswick, NJ, USA  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Economic Theory  |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg  |g 59/2(2015-06-01), 277-300  |x 0938-2259  |q 59:2<277  |1 2015  |2 59  |o 199