caa a22 4500 605475962 CHVBK 20210128100354.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00199-014-0829-8 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00199-014-0829-8 Carbonell-Nicolau Oriol Department of Economics, Rutgers University, 75 Hamilton Street, 08901, New Brunswick, NJ, USA aut Further results on essential Nash equilibria in normal-form games [Elektronische Daten] [Oriol Carbonell-Nicolau] A Nash equilibrium $$x$$ x of a normal-form game $$G$$ G is essential if any perturbation of $$G$$ G has an equilibrium close to $$x$$ x . Using payoff perturbations, we identify a new collection of games containing a dense, residual subset of games whose Nash equilibria are all essential. This collection covers economic examples that cannot be handled by extant results and subsumes the sets of games considered in the literature. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 Infinite normal-form game nationallicence Equilibrium refinement nationallicence Essential equilibrium nationallicence Equilibrium existence nationallicence Continuous security nationallicence Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 59/2(2015-06-01), 277-300 0938-2259 59:2<277 2015 59 199 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0829-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0829-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Carbonell-Nicolau Oriol Department of Economics, Rutgers University, 75 Hamilton Street, 08901, New Brunswick, NJ, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economic Theory Springer Berlin Heidelberg 59/2(2015-06-01), 277-300 0938-2259 59:2<277 2015 59 199