The Influence of Unrelated and Related Diversification on Fraudulent Reporting

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Subrata Chakrabarty]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Journal of Business Ethics, 131/4(2015-11-01), 815-832
Format:
Artikel (online)
ID: 605483817
LEADER caa a22 4500
001 605483817
003 CHVBK
005 20210128100433.0
007 cr unu---uuuuu
008 210128e20151101xx s 000 0 eng
024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s10551-013-2023-5  |2 doi 
035 |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10551-013-2023-5 
100 1 |a Chakrabarty  |D Subrata  |u Department of Management, College of Business Administration, University of Nebraska - Lincoln, 68588-0491, Lincoln, NE, USA  |4 aut 
245 1 4 |a The Influence of Unrelated and Related Diversification on Fraudulent Reporting  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Subrata Chakrabarty] 
520 3 |a This study suggests that unrelated diversification has a positive influence on the probability of fraudulent reporting whereas related diversification has a negative influence on the probability of fraudulent reporting. The strength of the influence of these corporate level strategies is contingent on the moral character of the firm. Unrelated diversification provides opportunity for financial innovation within the firm's internal capital market, which can result in fraudulent reporting. This is more likely when the moral character of the firm is driven by a conscienceless financial self-interest motive, as implied by the firm's contempt toward the larger community (in terms of damage inflicted on the interests of people outside the firm). In contrast, related diversification, where product divisions focus on mutual sharing and monitoring of operational activities, can reduce the probability of fraudulent reporting. This is more likely when constituents within the firm view themselves as moral citizens, as implied by the firm's benevolence toward the larger community. Hence, while unrelated diversification focuses the energies of managers within the firm on financial manipulation, related diversification focuses these energies on productive purposes. 
540 |a Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2013 
690 7 |a Fraudulent reporting  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Unrelated diversification  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Related diversification  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Community  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Corporate social responsibility  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Sustainability  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Corporate governance  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Agency theory  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Stakeholder theory  |2 nationallicence 
773 0 |t Journal of Business Ethics  |d Springer Netherlands  |g 131/4(2015-11-01), 815-832  |x 0167-4544  |q 131:4<815  |1 2015  |2 131  |o 10551 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-2023-5  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
898 |a BK010053  |b XK010053  |c XK010000 
900 7 |a Metadata rights reserved  |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence  |2 nationallicence 
908 |D 1  |a research-article  |2 jats 
949 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |F NATIONALLICENCE  |b NL-springer 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 856  |E 40  |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-2023-5  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 100  |E 1-  |a Chakrabarty  |D Subrata  |u Department of Management, College of Business Administration, University of Nebraska - Lincoln, 68588-0491, Lincoln, NE, USA  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Journal of Business Ethics  |d Springer Netherlands  |g 131/4(2015-11-01), 815-832  |x 0167-4544  |q 131:4<815  |1 2015  |2 131  |o 10551