The Impact of Budget Goal Difficulty and Promotion Availability on Employee Fraud

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Shana Clor-Proell, Steven Kaplan, Chad Proell]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Journal of Business Ethics, 131/4(2015-11-01), 773-790
Format:
Artikel (online)
ID: 605483833
LEADER caa a22 4500
001 605483833
003 CHVBK
005 20210128100433.0
007 cr unu---uuuuu
008 210128e20151101xx s 000 0 eng
024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s10551-013-2021-7  |2 doi 
035 |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10551-013-2021-7 
245 0 4 |a The Impact of Budget Goal Difficulty and Promotion Availability on Employee Fraud  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Shana Clor-Proell, Steven Kaplan, Chad Proell] 
520 3 |a The purpose of this research is to examine the effect of two organizational variables, budget goal difficulty and promotion availability, on employee fraud (e.g., stealing). Limited research shows that difficult, specific goals result in more unethical behavior than general goals (Schweitzer et al., Acad Manag J 47(3):422-432, 2004). We predict that goal difficulty and promotion availability will interact to affect employee fraud. Specifically, we contend that the availability of promotions will have little, if any, effect on employee fraud under easy goals but have a substantial effect on fraud under extremely difficult goals. To test this prediction, we use an experiment in which participants play the role of production employees. All participants are assigned cost goals and are responsible for reporting costs to the organization. Information asymmetry exists such that the organization is unable to assess whether costs have been reported accurately, and any overstatement of costs directly increases the employee's compensation at the expense of the organization. The results of our experiment support the prediction, even though the cost goal is not tied to current period compensation (e.g., a mere goal). Our results have implications for academics and practitioners concerned with factors that affect fraud in organizations. 
540 |a Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2013 
690 7 |a Experiment  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Goal setting  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Employee fraud  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Promotions  |2 nationallicence 
700 1 |a Clor-Proell  |D Shana  |u Neeley School of Business, Texas Christian University (TCU), Fort Worth, TX, USA  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Kaplan  |D Steven  |u School of Accountancy, Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ, USA  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Proell  |D Chad  |u Neeley School of Business, Texas Christian University (TCU), Fort Worth, TX, USA  |4 aut 
773 0 |t Journal of Business Ethics  |d Springer Netherlands  |g 131/4(2015-11-01), 773-790  |x 0167-4544  |q 131:4<773  |1 2015  |2 131  |o 10551 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-2021-7  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
898 |a BK010053  |b XK010053  |c XK010000 
900 7 |a Metadata rights reserved  |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence  |2 nationallicence 
908 |D 1  |a research-article  |2 jats 
949 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |F NATIONALLICENCE  |b NL-springer 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 856  |E 40  |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-2021-7  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Clor-Proell  |D Shana  |u Neeley School of Business, Texas Christian University (TCU), Fort Worth, TX, USA  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Kaplan  |D Steven  |u School of Accountancy, Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ, USA  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Proell  |D Chad  |u Neeley School of Business, Texas Christian University (TCU), Fort Worth, TX, USA  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Journal of Business Ethics  |d Springer Netherlands  |g 131/4(2015-11-01), 773-790  |x 0167-4544  |q 131:4<773  |1 2015  |2 131  |o 10551