caa a22 4500 605488738 CHVBK 20210128100456.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10683-014-9412-1 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10683-014-9412-1 One bad apple? Heterogeneity and information in public good provision [Elektronische Daten] [Angela de Oliveira, Rachel Croson, Catherine Eckel] Previous research demonstrates that individuals vary in their social preferences. Less well-understood is how group composition affects the behavior of different social preference types. Does one bad apple really spoil the bunch? This paper exogenously identifies experimental participants' social preferences, then systematically assigns individuals to homogeneous or heterogeneous groups to examine the impact of ‘bad apples' on cooperation and efficiency. Consistent with previous research, we find that groups with more selfish types achieve lower levels of efficiency. We identify two mechanisms for the effect. First, the selfish players contribute less. Second, selfish players induce lower contributions from the conditional cooperators, and this effect increases in the number of selfish players. These results are not sensitive to information about the distribution of types in the group. Economic Science Association, 2014 Public goods nationallicence Group composition nationallicence Cooperation nationallicence Social preference types nationallicence Heterogeneity nationallicence de Oliveira Angela University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics, 203 Stockbridge Hall, 80 Campus Center Way, 01003, Amherst, MA, USA aut Croson Rachel University of Texas, Arlington Dean, College of Business, 701 S. West Street, Room 334, Box 19377, 76019, Arlington, TX, USA aut Eckel Catherine Texas A&M University, Department of Economics 4228 TAMU, 77843-4228, College Station, TX, USA aut Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/1(2015-03-01), 116-135 1386-4157 18:1<116 2015 18 10683 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9412-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9412-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- de Oliveira Angela University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics, 203 Stockbridge Hall, 80 Campus Center Way, 01003, Amherst, MA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Croson Rachel University of Texas, Arlington Dean, College of Business, 701 S. West Street, Room 334, Box 19377, 76019, Arlington, TX, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Eckel Catherine Texas A&M University, Department of Economics 4228 TAMU, 77843-4228, College Station, TX, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/1(2015-03-01), 116-135 1386-4157 18:1<116 2015 18 10683