State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0 |2 doi |
| 035 | |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0 | ||
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Kenju Kamei, Louis Putterman, Jean-Robert Tyran] |
| 520 | 3 | |a We investigate the endogenous formation of sanctioning institutions supposed to improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. Our paper parallels Markussen et al. (Rev Econ Stud 81:301-324, 2014) in that our experimental subjects vote over formal versus informal sanctions, but it goes beyond that paper by endogenizing the formal sanction scheme. We find that self-determined formal sanctions schemes are popular and efficient when they carry no up-front cost, but as in Markussen et al. informal sanctions are more popular and efficient than formal sanctions when adopting the latter entails such a cost. Practice improves the performance of sanction schemes: they become more targeted and deterrent with learning. Voters' characteristics, including their tendency to engage in perverse informal sanctioning, help to predict individual voting. | |
| 540 | |a Economic Science Association, 2014 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a Sanction |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Social dilemma |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Public goods |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Voluntary contribution mechanism |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Punishment |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Experiment |2 nationallicence | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Kamei |D Kenju |u Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH, USA |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Putterman |D Louis |u Department of Economics, Box B, Brown University, 02912, Providence, RI, USA |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Tyran |D Jean-Robert |u University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Experimental Economics |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com |g 18/1(2015-03-01), 38-65 |x 1386-4157 |q 18:1<38 |1 2015 |2 18 |o 10683 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI |
| 898 | |a BK010053 |b XK010053 |c XK010000 | ||
| 900 | 7 | |a Metadata rights reserved |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence |2 nationallicence | |
| 908 | |D 1 |a research-article |2 jats | ||
| 949 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |F NATIONALLICENCE |b NL-springer | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Kamei |D Kenju |u Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH, USA |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Putterman |D Louis |u Department of Economics, Box B, Brown University, 02912, Providence, RI, USA |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Tyran |D Jean-Robert |u University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Experimental Economics |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com |g 18/1(2015-03-01), 38-65 |x 1386-4157 |q 18:1<38 |1 2015 |2 18 |o 10683 | ||