caa a22 4500 605488762 CHVBK 20210128100456.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0 State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods [Elektronische Daten] [Kenju Kamei, Louis Putterman, Jean-Robert Tyran] We investigate the endogenous formation of sanctioning institutions supposed to improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. Our paper parallels Markussen et al. (Rev Econ Stud 81:301-324, 2014) in that our experimental subjects vote over formal versus informal sanctions, but it goes beyond that paper by endogenizing the formal sanction scheme. We find that self-determined formal sanctions schemes are popular and efficient when they carry no up-front cost, but as in Markussen et al. informal sanctions are more popular and efficient than formal sanctions when adopting the latter entails such a cost. Practice improves the performance of sanction schemes: they become more targeted and deterrent with learning. Voters' characteristics, including their tendency to engage in perverse informal sanctioning, help to predict individual voting. Economic Science Association, 2014 Sanction nationallicence Social dilemma nationallicence Public goods nationallicence Voluntary contribution mechanism nationallicence Punishment nationallicence Experiment nationallicence Kamei Kenju Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH, USA aut Putterman Louis Department of Economics, Box B, Brown University, 02912, Providence, RI, USA aut Tyran Jean-Robert University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria aut Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/1(2015-03-01), 38-65 1386-4157 18:1<38 2015 18 10683 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Kamei Kenju Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Putterman Louis Department of Economics, Box B, Brown University, 02912, Providence, RI, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Tyran Jean-Robert University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/1(2015-03-01), 38-65 1386-4157 18:1<38 2015 18 10683