Incomplete punishment networks in public goods games: experimental evidence

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Andreas Leibbrandt, Abhijit Ramalingam, Lauri Sääksvuori, James Walker]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Experimental Economics, 18/1(2015-03-01), 15-37
Format:
Artikel (online)
ID: 605488789
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024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s10683-014-9402-3  |2 doi 
035 |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10683-014-9402-3 
245 0 0 |a Incomplete punishment networks in public goods games: experimental evidence  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Andreas Leibbrandt, Abhijit Ramalingam, Lauri Sääksvuori, James Walker] 
520 3 |a Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctioning. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions in alternative punishment networks. Our results show that the structure of punishment network significantly affects allocations to the public good. In addition, we observe that network configurations are more important than punishment capacities for the levels of public good provision, imposed sanctions and economic efficiency. Lastly, we show that targeted revenge is a major driver of anti-social punishment. 
540 |a The Author(s), 2014 
690 7 |a Public goods experiment  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Punishment  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Cooperation  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Networks  |2 nationallicence 
700 1 |a Leibbrandt  |D Andreas  |u Department of Economics, Monash University, 3800, Clayton, VIC, Australia  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Ramalingam  |D Abhijit  |u School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Sääksvuori  |D Lauri  |u Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Walker  |D James  |u Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA  |4 aut 
773 0 |t Experimental Economics  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 18/1(2015-03-01), 15-37  |x 1386-4157  |q 18:1<15  |1 2015  |2 18  |o 10683 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9402-3  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
898 |a BK010053  |b XK010053  |c XK010000 
900 7 |a Metadata rights reserved  |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence  |2 nationallicence 
908 |D 1  |a research-article  |2 jats 
949 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |F NATIONALLICENCE  |b NL-springer 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 856  |E 40  |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9402-3  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Leibbrandt  |D Andreas  |u Department of Economics, Monash University, 3800, Clayton, VIC, Australia  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Ramalingam  |D Abhijit  |u School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Sääksvuori  |D Lauri  |u Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Walker  |D James  |u Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Experimental Economics  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 18/1(2015-03-01), 15-37  |x 1386-4157  |q 18:1<15  |1 2015  |2 18  |o 10683