caa a22 4500 605488789 CHVBK 20210128100457.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10683-014-9402-3 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10683-014-9402-3 Incomplete punishment networks in public goods games: experimental evidence [Elektronische Daten] [Andreas Leibbrandt, Abhijit Ramalingam, Lauri Sääksvuori, James Walker] Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctioning. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions in alternative punishment networks. Our results show that the structure of punishment network significantly affects allocations to the public good. In addition, we observe that network configurations are more important than punishment capacities for the levels of public good provision, imposed sanctions and economic efficiency. Lastly, we show that targeted revenge is a major driver of anti-social punishment. The Author(s), 2014 Public goods experiment nationallicence Punishment nationallicence Cooperation nationallicence Networks nationallicence Leibbrandt Andreas Department of Economics, Monash University, 3800, Clayton, VIC, Australia aut Ramalingam Abhijit School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK aut Sääksvuori Lauri Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany aut Walker James Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA aut Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/1(2015-03-01), 15-37 1386-4157 18:1<15 2015 18 10683 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9402-3 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9402-3 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Leibbrandt Andreas Department of Economics, Monash University, 3800, Clayton, VIC, Australia aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Ramalingam Abhijit School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Sääksvuori Lauri Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Walker James Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/1(2015-03-01), 15-37 1386-4157 18:1<15 2015 18 10683