caa a22 4500 605488797 CHVBK 20210128100457.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10683-014-9393-0 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10683-014-9393-0 Promoting cooperation in nonlinear social dilemmas through peer punishment [Elektronische Daten] [Timothy Cason, Lata Gangadharan] Many social dilemmas exhibit nonlinearities and equilibrium outcomes in the interior of the choice space. This paper reports a laboratory experiment studying whether peer punishment promotes socially efficient behavior in such environments, which have been ignored in most experimental studies of peer punishment. It compares the effectiveness of peer punishment in a linear public good game to the effectiveness of this decentralized enforcement mechanism in two nonlinear social dilemma games: a piecewise linear public good game and a common pool resource game. While peer punishment improves cooperation in these new environments, the impact of punishment is weaker and takes longer to be effective. This appears to be due to the greater complexity of the nonlinear settings, which makes socially optimal choices more difficult to identify. Economic Science Association, 2014 Experiment nationallicence Voluntary contributions mechanism nationallicence Common pool resources nationallicence Public goods nationallicence Nonlinear returns nationallicence Cason Timothy Department of Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA aut Gangadharan Lata Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia aut Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/1(2015-03-01), 66-88 1386-4157 18:1<66 2015 18 10683 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9393-0 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9393-0 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Cason Timothy Department of Economics, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Gangadharan Lata Department of Economics, Monash University, Clayton, VIC, Australia aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/1(2015-03-01), 66-88 1386-4157 18:1<66 2015 18 10683