Experimental departures from self-interest when competing partnerships share output
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s10683-014-9413-0 |2 doi |
| 035 | |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10683-014-9413-0 | ||
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Experimental departures from self-interest when competing partnerships share output |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Josh Cherry, Stephen Salant, Neslihan Uler] |
| 520 | 3 | |a When every individual's effort imposes negative externalities, self-interested behavior leads to socially excessive effort. To curb these excesses when effort cannot be monitored, competing output-sharing partnerships can form. With the right-sized groups, aggregate effort falls to the socially optimal level. We investigate this theory experimentally and find that while it makes correct qualitative predictions, there are systematic quantitative deviations, always in the direction of the socially optimal investment. Using data on subjects' conjectures of each other's behavior we investigate altruism, conformity and extremeness aversion as possible explanations. We show that deviations are consistent with both altruism and conformity (but not extremeness aversion). | |
| 540 | |a Economic Science Association, 2014 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a Output-sharing |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Partnership solution |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Laboratory experiment |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Altruism |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Conformity |2 nationallicence | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Cherry |D Josh |u Kellogg School of Management, Chicago, IL, USA |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Salant |D Stephen |u University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Uler |D Neslihan |u University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Experimental Economics |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com |g 18/1(2015-03-01), 89-115 |x 1386-4157 |q 18:1<89 |1 2015 |2 18 |o 10683 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9413-0 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI |
| 898 | |a BK010053 |b XK010053 |c XK010000 | ||
| 900 | 7 | |a Metadata rights reserved |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence |2 nationallicence | |
| 908 | |D 1 |a research-article |2 jats | ||
| 949 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |F NATIONALLICENCE |b NL-springer | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9413-0 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Cherry |D Josh |u Kellogg School of Management, Chicago, IL, USA |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Salant |D Stephen |u University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Uler |D Neslihan |u University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Experimental Economics |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com |g 18/1(2015-03-01), 89-115 |x 1386-4157 |q 18:1<89 |1 2015 |2 18 |o 10683 | ||