caa a22 4500 605488819 CHVBK 20210128100457.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10683-013-9382-8 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10683-013-9382-8 Cooperation in small groups: the effect of group size [Elektronische Daten] [Daniele Nosenzo, Simone Quercia, Martin Sefton] We study the effect of group size on cooperation in voluntary contribution mechanism games. As in previous experiments, we study four- and eight-person groups in high and low marginal per capita return (MPCR) conditions. We find a positive effect of group size in the low MPCR condition, as in previous experiments. However, in the high MPCR condition we observe a negative group size effect. We extend the design to investigate two- and three-person groups in the high MPCR condition, and find that cooperation is highest of all in two-person groups. The findings in the high MPCR condition are consistent with those from n-person prisoner's dilemma and oligopoly experiments that suggest it is more difficult to sustain cooperation in larger groups. The findings from the low MPCR condition suggest that this effect can be overridden. In particular, when cooperation is low other factors, such as considerations of the social benefits of contributing (which increase with group size), may dominate any negative group size effect. The Author(s), 2013 Voluntary contribution mechanism nationallicence Cooperation nationallicence Group size nationallicence Nosenzo Daniele School of Economics, University of Nottingham, NG7 2RD, University Park, Nottingham, UK aut Quercia Simone School of Economics, University of Nottingham, NG7 2RD, University Park, Nottingham, UK aut Sefton Martin School of Economics, University of Nottingham, NG7 2RD, University Park, Nottingham, UK aut Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/1(2015-03-01), 4-14 1386-4157 18:1<4 2015 18 10683 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9382-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9382-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Nosenzo Daniele School of Economics, University of Nottingham, NG7 2RD, University Park, Nottingham, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Quercia Simone School of Economics, University of Nottingham, NG7 2RD, University Park, Nottingham, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Sefton Martin School of Economics, University of Nottingham, NG7 2RD, University Park, Nottingham, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/1(2015-03-01), 4-14 1386-4157 18:1<4 2015 18 10683