Doing good or doing harm: experimental evidence on giving and taking in public good games

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Menusch Khadjavi, Andreas Lange]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Experimental Economics, 18/3(2015-09-01), 432-441
Format:
Artikel (online)
ID: 605488827
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024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s10683-014-9411-2  |2 doi 
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245 0 0 |a Doing good or doing harm: experimental evidence on giving and taking in public good games  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Menusch Khadjavi, Andreas Lange] 
520 3 |a We replicate Andreoni (Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 1-21, 1995)'s finding that agents behave more selfishly when taking from a public account than when giving to a public good. Based on a neutral language setting we add new insights into motivations to give or take in a linear public good setting: we find that Andreoni's result is partly driven by the complete elimination of giving options in the taking frame. However, a pure extension of the action space into the taking domain also leads to a significant increase in selfish behavior. 
540 |a Economic Science Association, 2014 
690 7 |a Public good  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Voluntary provision  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Taking  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Experiments  |2 nationallicence 
700 1 |a Khadjavi  |D Menusch  |u University of Kiel and Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Lange  |D Andreas  |u Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Von Melle Park 5, 20146, Hamburg, Germany  |4 aut 
773 0 |t Experimental Economics  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 18/3(2015-09-01), 432-441  |x 1386-4157  |q 18:3<432  |1 2015  |2 18  |o 10683 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9411-2  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
898 |a BK010053  |b XK010053  |c XK010000 
900 7 |a Metadata rights reserved  |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence  |2 nationallicence 
908 |D 1  |a research-article  |2 jats 
949 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |F NATIONALLICENCE  |b NL-springer 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 856  |E 40  |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9411-2  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Khadjavi  |D Menusch  |u University of Kiel and Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Lange  |D Andreas  |u Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Von Melle Park 5, 20146, Hamburg, Germany  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Experimental Economics  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 18/3(2015-09-01), 432-441  |x 1386-4157  |q 18:3<432  |1 2015  |2 18  |o 10683