Excess information acquisition in auctions
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s10683-014-9406-z |2 doi |
| 035 | |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10683-014-9406-z | ||
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Excess information acquisition in auctions |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Vitali Gretschko, Alexander Rajko] |
| 520 | 3 | |a The acquisition of information is an important feature in most auctions where one's exact private valuation is unknown ex-ante. We conducted the first experiment in testing a risk-neutral expected surplus maximization model with this feature. Varying the auction format and the cost of information acquisition we found bidders in most cases acquired too much information. Moreover, bidders who remained uninformed placed bids significantly below the optimal bid. The general prediction concerning revenue and efficiency remains valid, as a higher information cost was associated with lower revenues and efficiency rates. We explore different ex-post explanations for the observed behavior and show that regret avoidance can explain the data while risk aversion and ambiguity aversion cannot. | |
| 540 | |a Economic Science Association, 2014 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a Dynamic auctions |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Information acquisition |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Bidding behavior |2 nationallicence | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Gretschko |D Vitali |u University of Cologne, Albertus Magnus Platz, 50923, Cologne, Germany |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Rajko |D Alexander |u University of Cologne, Albertus Magnus Platz, 50923, Cologne, Germany |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Experimental Economics |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com |g 18/3(2015-09-01), 335-355 |x 1386-4157 |q 18:3<335 |1 2015 |2 18 |o 10683 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9406-z |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI |
| 898 | |a BK010053 |b XK010053 |c XK010000 | ||
| 900 | 7 | |a Metadata rights reserved |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence |2 nationallicence | |
| 908 | |D 1 |a research-article |2 jats | ||
| 949 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |F NATIONALLICENCE |b NL-springer | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9406-z |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Gretschko |D Vitali |u University of Cologne, Albertus Magnus Platz, 50923, Cologne, Germany |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Rajko |D Alexander |u University of Cologne, Albertus Magnus Platz, 50923, Cologne, Germany |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Experimental Economics |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com |g 18/3(2015-09-01), 335-355 |x 1386-4157 |q 18:3<335 |1 2015 |2 18 |o 10683 | ||