caa a22 4500 605488851 CHVBK 20210128100457.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10683-014-9406-z doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10683-014-9406-z Excess information acquisition in auctions [Elektronische Daten] [Vitali Gretschko, Alexander Rajko] The acquisition of information is an important feature in most auctions where one's exact private valuation is unknown ex-ante. We conducted the first experiment in testing a risk-neutral expected surplus maximization model with this feature. Varying the auction format and the cost of information acquisition we found bidders in most cases acquired too much information. Moreover, bidders who remained uninformed placed bids significantly below the optimal bid. The general prediction concerning revenue and efficiency remains valid, as a higher information cost was associated with lower revenues and efficiency rates. We explore different ex-post explanations for the observed behavior and show that regret avoidance can explain the data while risk aversion and ambiguity aversion cannot. Economic Science Association, 2014 Dynamic auctions nationallicence Information acquisition nationallicence Bidding behavior nationallicence Gretschko Vitali University of Cologne, Albertus Magnus Platz, 50923, Cologne, Germany aut Rajko Alexander University of Cologne, Albertus Magnus Platz, 50923, Cologne, Germany aut Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/3(2015-09-01), 335-355 1386-4157 18:3<335 2015 18 10683 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9406-z text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9406-z text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Gretschko Vitali University of Cologne, Albertus Magnus Platz, 50923, Cologne, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Rajko Alexander University of Cologne, Albertus Magnus Platz, 50923, Cologne, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/3(2015-09-01), 335-355 1386-4157 18:3<335 2015 18 10683