Is it a norm to favour your own group?
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s10683-014-9417-9 |2 doi |
| 035 | |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10683-014-9417-9 | ||
| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Is it a norm to favour your own group? |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Donna Harris, Benedikt Herrmann, Andreas Kontoleon, Jonathan Newton] |
| 520 | 3 | |a This paper examines the relationship between norm enforcement and in-group favouritism behaviour. Using a new two-stage allocation experiment with punishments, we investigate whether in-group favouritism is considered as a social norm in itself or as a violation of a different norm, such as egalitarian norm. We find that which norm of behaviour is enforced depends on who the punisher is. If the punishers belong to the in-group, in-group favouritism is considered a norm and it does not get punished. If the punishers belong to the out-group, in-group favouritism is frequently punished. If the punishers belong to no group and merely observe in-group favouritism (the third-party), they do not seem to care sufficiently to be willing to punish this behaviour. Our results shed a new light on the effectiveness of altruistic norm enforcement when group identities are taken into account and help to explain why in-group favouritism is widespread across societies. | |
| 540 | |a Economic Science Association, 2014 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a In-group favouritism |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Group identity |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Social norms |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a In-group punishment |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Out-group punishment |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Third-party punishment |2 nationallicence | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Harris |D Donna |u Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Manor Road, OX1 3UQ, Oxford, UK |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Herrmann |D Benedikt |u Behavioural Economics Team, Institute for Health and Consumer Protection, Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Bruxelles, Belgium |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Kontoleon |D Andreas |u Institute for Health and Consumer Protection, The European Commission Joint Research Centre, Behavioural Economics Group, Via E. Fermi 2749, 21027, Ispra, Varese, Italy |4 aut | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Newton |D Jonathan |u School of Economics, University of Sydney, 2006, Sydney, NSW, Australia |4 aut | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Experimental Economics |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com |g 18/3(2015-09-01), 491-521 |x 1386-4157 |q 18:3<491 |1 2015 |2 18 |o 10683 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9417-9 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI |
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| 900 | 7 | |a Metadata rights reserved |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence |2 nationallicence | |
| 908 | |D 1 |a research-article |2 jats | ||
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| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9417-9 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Harris |D Donna |u Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Manor Road, OX1 3UQ, Oxford, UK |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Herrmann |D Benedikt |u Behavioural Economics Team, Institute for Health and Consumer Protection, Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Bruxelles, Belgium |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Kontoleon |D Andreas |u Institute for Health and Consumer Protection, The European Commission Joint Research Centre, Behavioural Economics Group, Via E. Fermi 2749, 21027, Ispra, Varese, Italy |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 700 |E 1- |a Newton |D Jonathan |u School of Economics, University of Sydney, 2006, Sydney, NSW, Australia |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Experimental Economics |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com |g 18/3(2015-09-01), 491-521 |x 1386-4157 |q 18:3<491 |1 2015 |2 18 |o 10683 | ||