caa a22 4500 605488878 CHVBK 20210128100457.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10683-014-9417-9 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10683-014-9417-9 Is it a norm to favour your own group? [Elektronische Daten] [Donna Harris, Benedikt Herrmann, Andreas Kontoleon, Jonathan Newton] This paper examines the relationship between norm enforcement and in-group favouritism behaviour. Using a new two-stage allocation experiment with punishments, we investigate whether in-group favouritism is considered as a social norm in itself or as a violation of a different norm, such as egalitarian norm. We find that which norm of behaviour is enforced depends on who the punisher is. If the punishers belong to the in-group, in-group favouritism is considered a norm and it does not get punished. If the punishers belong to the out-group, in-group favouritism is frequently punished. If the punishers belong to no group and merely observe in-group favouritism (the third-party), they do not seem to care sufficiently to be willing to punish this behaviour. Our results shed a new light on the effectiveness of altruistic norm enforcement when group identities are taken into account and help to explain why in-group favouritism is widespread across societies. Economic Science Association, 2014 In-group favouritism nationallicence Group identity nationallicence Social norms nationallicence In-group punishment nationallicence Out-group punishment nationallicence Third-party punishment nationallicence Harris Donna Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Manor Road, OX1 3UQ, Oxford, UK aut Herrmann Benedikt Behavioural Economics Team, Institute for Health and Consumer Protection, Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Bruxelles, Belgium aut Kontoleon Andreas Institute for Health and Consumer Protection, The European Commission Joint Research Centre, Behavioural Economics Group, Via E. Fermi 2749, 21027, Ispra, Varese, Italy aut Newton Jonathan School of Economics, University of Sydney, 2006, Sydney, NSW, Australia aut Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/3(2015-09-01), 491-521 1386-4157 18:3<491 2015 18 10683 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9417-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9417-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Harris Donna Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Manor Road, OX1 3UQ, Oxford, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Herrmann Benedikt Behavioural Economics Team, Institute for Health and Consumer Protection, Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Bruxelles, Belgium aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Kontoleon Andreas Institute for Health and Consumer Protection, The European Commission Joint Research Centre, Behavioural Economics Group, Via E. Fermi 2749, 21027, Ispra, Varese, Italy aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Newton Jonathan School of Economics, University of Sydney, 2006, Sydney, NSW, Australia aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/3(2015-09-01), 491-521 1386-4157 18:3<491 2015 18 10683