caa a22 4500 605488959 CHVBK 20210128105156.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20151201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10683-014-9425-9 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10683-014-9425-9 Propose with a rose? Signaling in internet dating markets [Elektronische Daten] [Soohyung Lee, Muriel Niederle] A growing number of papers theoretically study the effects of introducing a preference signaling mechanism. However, the empirical literature has had difficulty proving a basic tenet, namely that an agent has more success when the agent uses a signal. This paper provides evidence based on a field experiment in an online dating market. Participants are randomly endowed with two or eight "virtual roses” that a participant can use for free to signal special interest when asking for a date. Our results show that, by sending a rose, a person can substantially increase the chance of the offer being accepted, and this positive effect is neither because the rose attracts attention from recipients nor because the rose is associated with unobserved quality. Furthermore, we find evidence that roses increase the total number of dates, instead of crowding out offers without roses attached. Despite the positive effect of sending roses, a substantial fraction of participants do not fully utilize their endowment of roses and even those who exhaust their endowment on average do not properly use their roses to maximize their dating success. Economic Science Association, 2014 Field experiment nationallicence Matching nationallicence Preference signaling nationallicence Market design nationallicence Online dating nationallicence Lee Soohyung Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, USA aut Niederle Muriel Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, USA aut Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/4(2015-12-01), 731-755 1386-4157 18:4<731 2015 18 10683 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9425-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9425-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Lee Soohyung Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Niederle Muriel Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/4(2015-12-01), 731-755 1386-4157 18:4<731 2015 18 10683 SWISSBIB 527621641