Institution design and public good provision: an experimental study of the vote of confidence procedure
Gespeichert in:
Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Chloe Tergiman]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Experimental Economics, 18/4(2015-12-01), 697-717
Format:
Artikel (online)
Online Zugang:
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s10683-014-9423-y |2 doi |
| 035 | |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10683-014-9423-y | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Tergiman |D Chloe |u University of British Columbia and NYU's Center for Experimental and Social Sciences, Vancouver, Canada |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Institution design and public good provision: an experimental study of the vote of confidence procedure |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Chloe Tergiman] |
| 520 | 3 | |a Parliamentary democracies use the vote of confidence procedure, which links the survival of a government with that of a bill, in order to discipline members of the majority. In this paper I investigate the role that the vote of confidence procedure has on public good provision and show that it has unintended negative consequences: even when efficient, public goods may be turned down in favor of earmarked projects. I use a laboratory experiment to test my model and show that the increase in voting cohesion comes at the cost of a 23 % reduction in public good provision and more unequal earmarking. | |
| 540 | |a Economic Science Association, 2015 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a Multilateral legislative bargaining |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Vote of confidence procedure |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Proposer power |2 nationallicence | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Experimental Economics |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com |g 18/4(2015-12-01), 697-717 |x 1386-4157 |q 18:4<697 |1 2015 |2 18 |o 10683 | |
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| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9423-y |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 100 |E 1- |a Tergiman |D Chloe |u University of British Columbia and NYU's Center for Experimental and Social Sciences, Vancouver, Canada |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Experimental Economics |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com |g 18/4(2015-12-01), 697-717 |x 1386-4157 |q 18:4<697 |1 2015 |2 18 |o 10683 | ||