Institution design and public good provision: an experimental study of the vote of confidence procedure

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Chloe Tergiman]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Experimental Economics, 18/4(2015-12-01), 697-717
Format:
Artikel (online)
ID: 605488983
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024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s10683-014-9423-y  |2 doi 
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100 1 |a Tergiman  |D Chloe  |u University of British Columbia and NYU's Center for Experimental and Social Sciences, Vancouver, Canada  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Institution design and public good provision: an experimental study of the vote of confidence procedure  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Chloe Tergiman] 
520 3 |a Parliamentary democracies use the vote of confidence procedure, which links the survival of a government with that of a bill, in order to discipline members of the majority. In this paper I investigate the role that the vote of confidence procedure has on public good provision and show that it has unintended negative consequences: even when efficient, public goods may be turned down in favor of earmarked projects. I use a laboratory experiment to test my model and show that the increase in voting cohesion comes at the cost of a 23 % reduction in public good provision and more unequal earmarking. 
540 |a Economic Science Association, 2015 
690 7 |a Multilateral legislative bargaining  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Vote of confidence procedure  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Proposer power  |2 nationallicence 
773 0 |t Experimental Economics  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 18/4(2015-12-01), 697-717  |x 1386-4157  |q 18:4<697  |1 2015  |2 18  |o 10683 
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900 7 |a Metadata rights reserved  |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence  |2 nationallicence 
908 |D 1  |a research-article  |2 jats 
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950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 856  |E 40  |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9423-y  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 100  |E 1-  |a Tergiman  |D Chloe  |u University of British Columbia and NYU's Center for Experimental and Social Sciences, Vancouver, Canada  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Experimental Economics  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 18/4(2015-12-01), 697-717  |x 1386-4157  |q 18:4<697  |1 2015  |2 18  |o 10683