Self-control, commitment and peer pressure: a laboratory experiment

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Aurélie Bonein, Laurent Denant-Boèmont]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Experimental Economics, 18/4(2015-12-01), 543-568
Format:
Artikel (online)
ID: 605489017
LEADER caa a22 4500
001 605489017
003 CHVBK
005 20210128100458.0
007 cr unu---uuuuu
008 210128e20151201xx s 000 0 eng
024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s10683-014-9419-7  |2 doi 
035 |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10683-014-9419-7 
245 0 0 |a Self-control, commitment and peer pressure: a laboratory experiment  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Aurélie Bonein, Laurent Denant-Boèmont] 
520 3 |a This paper focuses on the relationship between individual self-control and peer pressure. To this end, we performed a laboratory experiment that proceeded in two parts. The first part involved an individual real-effort task in which subjects could commit themselves to a particular level of performance while being tempted by an alternative recreational activity. The second part consisted of bargaining in a power-to-take game in which previously earned revenues were at stake. The experimental treatments involved variations in the available information provided to peers about previous individual behavior. The results show that many subjects make a serious commitment. Further, the subsequent revelation of commitment level induces subjects to increase the credible components of their commitment decisions. Past individual behaviors also play a role in bargaining because (i) partners who have committed themselves benefit from lower rates of both take and destruction and (ii) partners who have succumbed to temptation suffer from higher rates of both take and destruction. 
540 |a Economic Science Association, 2015 
690 7 |a Self-control  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Temptation  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Commitment  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Willpower  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Laboratory experiment  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Peer pressure  |2 nationallicence 
700 1 |a Bonein  |D Aurélie  |u CREM - University Rennes 1, Rennes, France  |4 aut 
700 1 |a Denant-Boèmont  |D Laurent  |u CREM - University Rennes 1, Rennes, France  |4 aut 
773 0 |t Experimental Economics  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 18/4(2015-12-01), 543-568  |x 1386-4157  |q 18:4<543  |1 2015  |2 18  |o 10683 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9419-7  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
898 |a BK010053  |b XK010053  |c XK010000 
900 7 |a Metadata rights reserved  |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence  |2 nationallicence 
908 |D 1  |a research-article  |2 jats 
949 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |F NATIONALLICENCE  |b NL-springer 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 856  |E 40  |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9419-7  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Bonein  |D Aurélie  |u CREM - University Rennes 1, Rennes, France  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 700  |E 1-  |a Denant-Boèmont  |D Laurent  |u CREM - University Rennes 1, Rennes, France  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Experimental Economics  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 18/4(2015-12-01), 543-568  |x 1386-4157  |q 18:4<543  |1 2015  |2 18  |o 10683