caa a22 4500 60548905X CHVBK 20210128100458.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10683-014-9398-8 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10683-014-9398-8 Paradoxes and mechanisms for choice under risk [Elektronische Daten] [James Cox, Vjollca Sadiraj, Ulrich Schmidt] Experiments on choice under risk typically involve multiple decisions by individual subjects. The choice of mechanism for selecting decision(s) for payoff is an essential design feature unless subjects isolate each one of the multiple decisions. We report treatments with different payoff mechanisms but the same decision tasks. The data show large differences across mechanisms in subjects' revealed risk preferences, a clear violation of isolation. We illustrate the importance of these mechanism effects by identifying their implications for classical tests of theories of decision under risk. We discuss theoretical properties of commonly used mechanisms, and new mechanisms introduced herein, in order to clarify which mechanisms are theoretically incentive compatible for which theories. We identify behavioral properties of some mechanisms that can introduce bias in elicited risk preferences—from cross-task contamination—even when the mechanism used is theoretically incentive compatible. We explain that selection of a payoff mechanism is an important component of experimental design in many topic areas including social preferences, public goods, bargaining, and choice under uncertainty and ambiguity as well as experiments on decisions under risk. The Author(s), 2014 Payoff mechanisms nationallicence Incentive compatibility nationallicence Experiments nationallicence Cross-task contamination nationallicence Paradoxes nationallicence Cox James Experimental Economics Center and Department of Economics, Georgia State University, 14 Marietta St. NW, 30303, Atlanta, GA, USA aut Sadiraj Vjollca Experimental Economics Center and Department of Economics, Georgia State University, 14 Marietta St. NW, 30303, Atlanta, GA, USA aut Schmidt Ulrich Department of Economics, University of Kiel, Wilhelm-Seelig-Platz 1, 24098, Kiel, Germany aut Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/2(2015-06-01), 215-250 1386-4157 18:2<215 2015 18 10683 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9398-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9398-8 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Cox James Experimental Economics Center and Department of Economics, Georgia State University, 14 Marietta St. NW, 30303, Atlanta, GA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Sadiraj Vjollca Experimental Economics Center and Department of Economics, Georgia State University, 14 Marietta St. NW, 30303, Atlanta, GA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Schmidt Ulrich Department of Economics, University of Kiel, Wilhelm-Seelig-Platz 1, 24098, Kiel, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Experimental Economics Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 18/2(2015-06-01), 215-250 1386-4157 18:2<215 2015 18 10683