Combined Equilibria for Conflict Problems*

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[E. Smol'yakov]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Cybernetics and Systems Analysis, 51/6(2015-11-01), 929-938
Format:
Artikel (online)
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024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s10559-015-9785-y  |2 doi 
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100 1 |a Smol'yakov  |D E.  |u M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Combined Equilibria for Conflict Problems*  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [E. Smol'yakov] 
520 3 |a The author proposes new concepts of equilibria. Though they have a complex description, they are very useful to find the unique solution in game problems (static and dynamic), including the cases where some known equilibria, important for finding the solution, are empty. 
540 |a Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2015 
690 7 |a game theory  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a combined conflict equilibria  |2 nationallicence 
773 0 |t Cybernetics and Systems Analysis  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 51/6(2015-11-01), 929-938  |x 1060-0396  |q 51:6<929  |1 2015  |2 51  |o 10559 
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908 |D 1  |a research-article  |2 jats 
949 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |F NATIONALLICENCE  |b NL-springer 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 856  |E 40  |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10559-015-9785-y  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 100  |E 1-  |a Smol'yakov  |D E.  |u M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Cybernetics and Systems Analysis  |d Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com  |g 51/6(2015-11-01), 929-938  |x 1060-0396  |q 51:6<929  |1 2015  |2 51  |o 10559