caa a22 4500 605519277 CHVBK 20210128100729.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10559-015-9711-3 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10559-015-9711-3 Smol'yakov E. M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia aut Individual-Pareto Equilibria for Game Problems with Side Interests of Participants1 [Elektronische Daten] [E. Smol'yakov] This article proposes concepts of weak equilibria, which are useful in searching for solutions to conflict problems with side interests of participants and combine the concepts of conflict stability and concepts of individual-Pareto sets, and also formulates a methodology for solving such problems. Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2015 theory of games and conflicts nationallicence game equilibrium nationallicence differential game nationallicence Cybernetics and Systems Analysis Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 51/2(2015-03-01), 187-197 1060-0396 51:2<187 2015 51 10559 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10559-015-9711-3 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10559-015-9711-3 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Smol'yakov E. M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Cybernetics and Systems Analysis Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 51/2(2015-03-01), 187-197 1060-0396 51:2<187 2015 51 10559