What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case?
Gespeichert in:
Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Franz Huber]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 44/1(2015-02-01), 81-110
Format:
Artikel (online)
Online Zugang:
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| 100 | 1 | |a Huber |D Franz |u Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Jackman Humanities Building 170 St. George Street, M5R 2M8, Toronto, ON, Canada |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a What Should I Believe About What Would Have Been the Case? |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Franz Huber] |
| 520 | 3 | |a The question I am addressing in this paper is the following: how is it possible to empirically test, or confirm, counterfactuals? After motivating this question in Section1, I will look at two approaches to counterfactuals, and at how counterfactuals can be empirically tested, or confirmed, if at all, on these accounts in Section2. I will then digress into the philosophy of probability in Section3. The reason for this digression is that I want to use the way observable absolute and relative frequencies, two empirical notions, are used to empirically test, or confirm, hypotheses about objective chances, a metaphysical notion, as a role-model. Specifically, I want to use this probabilistic account of the testing of chance hypotheses as a role-model for the account of the testing of counterfactuals, another metaphysical notion, that I will present in Sections 4 to 8. I will conclude by comparing my proposal to one non-probabilistic and one probabilistic alternative in Section9. | |
| 540 | |a Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2014 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a Counterfactuals |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Conditional belief |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Chance |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Credence |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Confirmation |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Probability measures |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Ranking functions |2 nationallicence | |
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| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 100 |E 1- |a Huber |D Franz |u Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto, Jackman Humanities Building 170 St. George Street, M5R 2M8, Toronto, ON, Canada |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Journal of Philosophical Logic |d Springer Netherlands |g 44/1(2015-02-01), 81-110 |x 0022-3611 |q 44:1<81 |1 2015 |2 44 |o 10992 | ||