Humans and monkeys distinguish between self-generated, opposing, and random actions
Gespeichert in:
Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Justin Couchman]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Animal Cognition, 18/1(2015-01-01), 231-238
Format:
Artikel (online)
Online Zugang:
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| 024 | 7 | 0 | |a 10.1007/s10071-014-0792-6 |2 doi |
| 035 | |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10071-014-0792-6 | ||
| 100 | 1 | |a Couchman |D Justin |u Department of Psychology, Albright College, 19604, Reading, PA, USA |4 aut | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | |a Humans and monkeys distinguish between self-generated, opposing, and random actions |h [Elektronische Daten] |c [Justin Couchman] |
| 520 | 3 | |a The sense of self-agency results from monitoring the relationship between prior thoughts and action plans, sensorimotor information, and perceived outcomes. It is thought to be an important factor underlying self-recognition and self-awareness. Three experiments investigated the sense of self-agency in humans and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). First, humans were asked to move a cursor with a joystick while several distractor cursors also moved on-screen. They were asked to identify either the cursor they were controlling, or a distractor using visual cues alone. Six rhesus macaques were then given a similar task in which they needed to identify a self-controlled cursor that was paired with several different types of distractors. Both groups were able to identify the self-controlled cursor, and monkeys performed best when the oppositely moving cursor was the distractor. A third experiment showed that humans, like macaques, use both perceptual and self-agency information to make decisions. | |
| 540 | |a Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 | ||
| 690 | 7 | |a Agency |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Self-agency |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Self-monitoring |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Self-recognition |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Voluntary action |2 nationallicence | |
| 690 | 7 | |a Rhesus macaque |2 nationallicence | |
| 773 | 0 | |t Animal Cognition |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 18/1(2015-01-01), 231-238 |x 1435-9448 |q 18:1<231 |1 2015 |2 18 |o 10071 | |
| 856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-014-0792-6 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI |
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| 900 | 7 | |a Metadata rights reserved |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence |2 nationallicence | |
| 908 | |D 1 |a research-article |2 jats | ||
| 949 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |F NATIONALLICENCE |b NL-springer | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 856 |E 40 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-014-0792-6 |q text/html |z Onlinezugriff via DOI | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 100 |E 1- |a Couchman |D Justin |u Department of Psychology, Albright College, 19604, Reading, PA, USA |4 aut | ||
| 950 | |B NATIONALLICENCE |P 773 |E 0- |t Animal Cognition |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg |g 18/1(2015-01-01), 231-238 |x 1435-9448 |q 18:1<231 |1 2015 |2 18 |o 10071 | ||