Humans and monkeys distinguish between self-generated, opposing, and random actions

Verfasser / Beitragende:
[Justin Couchman]
Ort, Verlag, Jahr:
2015
Enthalten in:
Animal Cognition, 18/1(2015-01-01), 231-238
Format:
Artikel (online)
ID: 605541779
LEADER caa a22 4500
001 605541779
003 CHVBK
005 20210128100918.0
007 cr unu---uuuuu
008 210128e20150101xx s 000 0 eng
024 7 0 |a 10.1007/s10071-014-0792-6  |2 doi 
035 |a (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10071-014-0792-6 
100 1 |a Couchman  |D Justin  |u Department of Psychology, Albright College, 19604, Reading, PA, USA  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Humans and monkeys distinguish between self-generated, opposing, and random actions  |h [Elektronische Daten]  |c [Justin Couchman] 
520 3 |a The sense of self-agency results from monitoring the relationship between prior thoughts and action plans, sensorimotor information, and perceived outcomes. It is thought to be an important factor underlying self-recognition and self-awareness. Three experiments investigated the sense of self-agency in humans and rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). First, humans were asked to move a cursor with a joystick while several distractor cursors also moved on-screen. They were asked to identify either the cursor they were controlling, or a distractor using visual cues alone. Six rhesus macaques were then given a similar task in which they needed to identify a self-controlled cursor that was paired with several different types of distractors. Both groups were able to identify the self-controlled cursor, and monkeys performed best when the oppositely moving cursor was the distractor. A third experiment showed that humans, like macaques, use both perceptual and self-agency information to make decisions. 
540 |a Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 
690 7 |a Agency  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Self-agency  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Self-monitoring  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Self-recognition  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Voluntary action  |2 nationallicence 
690 7 |a Rhesus macaque  |2 nationallicence 
773 0 |t Animal Cognition  |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg  |g 18/1(2015-01-01), 231-238  |x 1435-9448  |q 18:1<231  |1 2015  |2 18  |o 10071 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-014-0792-6  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
898 |a BK010053  |b XK010053  |c XK010000 
900 7 |a Metadata rights reserved  |b Springer special CC-BY-NC licence  |2 nationallicence 
908 |D 1  |a research-article  |2 jats 
949 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |F NATIONALLICENCE  |b NL-springer 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 856  |E 40  |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10071-014-0792-6  |q text/html  |z Onlinezugriff via DOI 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 100  |E 1-  |a Couchman  |D Justin  |u Department of Psychology, Albright College, 19604, Reading, PA, USA  |4 aut 
950 |B NATIONALLICENCE  |P 773  |E 0-  |t Animal Cognition  |d Springer Berlin Heidelberg  |g 18/1(2015-01-01), 231-238  |x 1435-9448  |q 18:1<231  |1 2015  |2 18  |o 10071