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   <subfield code="a">Collision Attack on Grindahl</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[Thomas Peyrin]</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Hash functions have been among the most scrutinized cryptographic primitives in the previous decade, mainly due to the cryptanalysis breakthroughs on MD-SHAfamily and the NIST SHA-3 competition that followed. Grindahl is a hash function proposed at FSE 2007 that inspired several SHA-3 candidates. One of its particularities is that it follows the AES design strategy, with an efficiency comparable to SHA-256. This paper provides the first cryptanalytic work on this scheme and we show that the $$256$$ 256 -bit version of Grindahl is not collision resistant. Our attack uses byte-level truncated differentials and leverages a counterintuitive method (reaching an internal state where all bytes are active) in order to ease the construction of good differential paths. Then, by a careful utilization of the freedom degrees inserted every round, and with a work effort of approximatively $$2^{112}$$ 2 112 hash computations, an attacker can generate a collision for the full $$256$$ 256 -bit version of Grindahl.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">International Association for Cryptologic Research, 2014</subfield>
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