caa a22 4500 606167935 CHVBK 20210128100704.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11127-015-0239-x doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11127-015-0239-x Macro shocks and costly political action in non-democracies [Elektronische Daten] [Michael Dorsch, Karl Dunz, Paul Maarek] This paper presents a theory of political instability in autocracies where the disenfranchised express their political preferences for a leadership replacement through costly political action. We focus on the business regulatory environment as an arena for autocratic rent-creation, as a source of information asymmetry between the autocrat and the disenfranchised, and as a potential political grievance for the disenfranchised. Within this context, we revisit the role of macro shocks as a catalyst for political instability and propose a novel informational channel through which macro shocks may trigger costly political action when the autocrat chooses to create rents through regulation that deteriorates the mean macroeconomic outcome. We then provide an empirical investigation of our theoretical hypotheses employing fixed-effects panel regressions and an instrumental variable strategy over a sample of non-democratic countries. Consistent with our theoretical hypotheses, we demonstrate that adverse economic shocks increase the probability of mass protest episodes, but that the magnitude of the effect depends on the extent to which business regulation is market-distorting. Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2015 Asymmetric information nationallicence Macro shocks nationallicence Mass protest nationallicence Political instability nationallicence Political turnover nationallicence Regulation nationallicence Rent-seeking nationallicence Dorsch Michael School of Public Policy, Central European University, Nádor u. 9, 1051, Budapest, Hungary aut Dunz Karl New Orleans, LA, USA aut Maarek Paul Department of Economics, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, 33 boulevard du Port, 95011, Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, France aut Public Choice Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 162/3-4(2015-03-01), 381-404 0048-5829 162:3-4<381 2015 162 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0239-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0239-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Dorsch Michael School of Public Policy, Central European University, Nádor u. 9, 1051, Budapest, Hungary aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Dunz Karl New Orleans, LA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Maarek Paul Department of Economics, Université de Cergy-Pontoise, 33 boulevard du Port, 95011, Cergy-Pontoise Cedex, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 162/3-4(2015-03-01), 381-404 0048-5829 162:3-4<381 2015 162 11127