<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">
 <record>
  <leader>     caa a22        4500</leader>
  <controlfield tag="001">606167951</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="003">CHVBK</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="005">20210128100705.0</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="007">cr unu---uuuuu</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="008">210128e20150301xx      s     000 0 eng  </controlfield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">10.1007/s11127-014-0224-9</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">(NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11127-014-0224-9</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1="0" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Legitimacy and the cost of government</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[Niclas Berggren, Christian Bjørnskov, David Lipka]</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">While previous research documents a negative relationship between government size and economic growth, suggesting an economic cost of big government, a given government size generally affects growth differently in different countries. As a possible explanation of this differential effect, we explore whether government legitimacy (measured by satisfaction with the way democracy works) influences how a certain government size affects growth. On the positive side, a government perceived as legitimate may &quot;get away” with being big since legitimacy can affect behavioral response to, and therefore the economic growth cost of, taxation and government expenditures. On the negative side, perceived legitimacy may make voters less prone to acquire information, which in turn facilitates interest-group oriented or populist policies that harm growth. A panel-data analysis of up to 30 developed countries, in which two different measures of the size of government are interacted with government legitimacy, reveals that perceived legitimacy exacerbates a negative growth effect of government size in the long run. This could be interpreted as governments taking advantage of being regarded as legitimate in order to secure short-term support at a long-term cost to the economy.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2014</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Legitimacy</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Economic growth</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Size of government</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Confidence</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="690" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Trust</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Berggren</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Niclas</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), P.O. Box 55665, 102 15, Stockholm, Sweden</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Bjørnskov</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Christian</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), P.O. Box 55665, 102 15, Stockholm, Sweden</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Lipka</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">David</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">School of International Relations and Diplomacy, Anglo-American University, Lázeňská 4, 118 00, Prague, Czech Republic</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="t">Public Choice</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">162/3-4(2015-03-01), 307-328</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0048-5829</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">162:3-4&lt;307</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2015</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">162</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">11127</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0224-9</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="898" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">BK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">XK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">XK010000</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="900" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Metadata rights reserved</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">Springer special CC-BY-NC licence</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="908" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="D">1</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">research-article</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">jats</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="949" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="F">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">NL-springer</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">856</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">40</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0224-9</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Berggren</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Niclas</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), P.O. Box 55665, 102 15, Stockholm, Sweden</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Bjørnskov</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Christian</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), P.O. Box 55665, 102 15, Stockholm, Sweden</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Lipka</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">David</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">School of International Relations and Diplomacy, Anglo-American University, Lázeňská 4, 118 00, Prague, Czech Republic</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">773</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">0-</subfield>
   <subfield code="t">Public Choice</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">162/3-4(2015-03-01), 307-328</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0048-5829</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">162:3-4&lt;307</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2015</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">162</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">11127</subfield>
  </datafield>
 </record>
</collection>
