caa a22 4500 606167978 CHVBK 20210128100705.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11127-014-0228-5 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11127-014-0228-5 Strategic electoral rule choice under uncertainty [Elektronische Daten] [Konstantinos Matakos, Dimitrios Xefteris] We study electoral rule choice in a multi-party model with office-motivated parties and electoral outcome uncertainty. We show that when all dominant parties (parties with positive probability of winning the election) have sufficiently good chances of winning, they agree to switch from the PR rule to a more majoritarian one in order to increase their chances of forming a single-party government. We identify the exact degree of disproportionality of the new rule and we prove that it is increasing in the expected vote share of the smaller parties (parties with zero probability of winning otherwise). The necessary and sufficient conditions for such collusion in favor of a majoritarian rule are: (a) the high rents from a single-party government and (b) sufficient uncertainty over the electoral outcome. Our theoretical predictions regarding the degree of the disproportionality of the electoral rule are supported by empirical evidence. Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2015 Electoral rules nationallicence Disproportionality nationallicence Seat premium nationallicence Single-party government nationallicence Uncertainty nationallicence Strategic coordination nationallicence Matakos Konstantinos Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, WC2A 2AE, London, United Kingdom aut Xefteris Dimitrios Department of Economics, University of Cyprus, 1678, Nicosia, Cyprus aut Public Choice Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 162/3-4(2015-03-01), 329-350 0048-5829 162:3-4<329 2015 162 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0228-5 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0228-5 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Matakos Konstantinos Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, WC2A 2AE, London, United Kingdom aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Xefteris Dimitrios Department of Economics, University of Cyprus, 1678, Nicosia, Cyprus aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 162/3-4(2015-03-01), 329-350 0048-5829 162:3-4<329 2015 162 11127