caa a22 4500 606168060 CHVBK 20210128100705.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11127-014-0221-z doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11127-014-0221-z How do elections affect international cooperation? Evidence from environmental treaty participation [Elektronische Daten] [Antoine Cazals, Alexandre Sauquet] Is there a strategically beneficial time for political leaders to make international environmental commitments? Based on the political cycles theory, we argue that leaders have incentives to delay costly ratification of international environmental agreements to the post-electoral period. However, the cost of participating in these agreements is often lower for developing countries, and they may enjoy indirect advantages, which may make them more prone to ratifying in the pre-electoral period. These hypotheses are assessed empirically by studying the ratification process of 41 global environmental agreements censused in the Environmental Treaties and Resources Indicators' database from 1976 to 1999. We use a duration model in which time is measured on a daily basis, enabling us to precisely identify pre- and post-electoral periods—a significant challenge in political cycles studies. Our investigation reveals the existence of political ratification cycles that are of substantial magnitude and non-linear over the pre- and post-electoral years. Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2015 International environmental agreements nationallicence Political cycles nationallicence Ratification nationallicence Duration model nationallicence Cazals Antoine Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International (CERDI), CNRS, UMR 6587, Clermont Université, Université d'Auvergne, 65 Boulevard François Mitterrand, 63009, Clermont-Ferrand, France aut Sauquet Alexandre Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International (CERDI), CNRS, UMR 6587, Clermont Université, Université d'Auvergne, 65 Boulevard François Mitterrand, 63009, Clermont-Ferrand, France aut Public Choice Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 162/3-4(2015-03-01), 263-285 0048-5829 162:3-4<263 2015 162 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0221-z text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0221-z text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Cazals Antoine Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International (CERDI), CNRS, UMR 6587, Clermont Université, Université d'Auvergne, 65 Boulevard François Mitterrand, 63009, Clermont-Ferrand, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Sauquet Alexandre Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Développement International (CERDI), CNRS, UMR 6587, Clermont Université, Université d'Auvergne, 65 Boulevard François Mitterrand, 63009, Clermont-Ferrand, France aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 162/3-4(2015-03-01), 263-285 0048-5829 162:3-4<263 2015 162 11127