caa a22 4500 606168095 CHVBK 20210128100705.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11127-014-0186-y doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11127-014-0186-y Pecorino Paul Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies, University of Alabama, Box 870224, 35487, Tuscaloosa, AL, USA aut Olson's Logic of Collective Action at fifty [Elektronische Daten] [Paul Pecorino] In the 50years since its publication, Mancur Olson's Logic of Collective Action has had an enormous impact on the academic literature in both economics and political science. In this review essay, I discuss Olson's work in light of the ensuing research, particularly developments in the theoretical literature. Much of the discussion focuses on the group-size paradox as applied to politics, i.e., the extent to which the group-size paradox can explain why the interests of some groups are better represented in the political process than others. I also discuss selective incentives with an emphasis on the byproduct mechanism under which a firm sells a private good and uses the resulting profits to provide a public good. Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2014 Mancur Olson nationallicence Logic of Collective Action nationallicence Group size paradox nationallicence Free rider problem nationallicence Public Choice Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 162/3-4(2015-03-01), 243-262 0048-5829 162:3-4<243 2015 162 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0186-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0186-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Pecorino Paul Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies, University of Alabama, Box 870224, 35487, Tuscaloosa, AL, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 162/3-4(2015-03-01), 243-262 0048-5829 162:3-4<243 2015 162 11127