caa a22 4500 606168265 CHVBK 20210128100706.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11127-015-0248-9 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11127-015-0248-9 The political economics of redistribution, inequality and tax avoidance [Elektronische Daten] [Carlos Bethencourt, Lars Kunze] A central result in the political economy of taxation is that the degree of redistribution is positively linked to income inequality. However, empirical evidence supporting such a relationship turns out to be mixed. This paper shows how the different empirical reactions can be rationalized within a simple model of tax avoidance and costly tax enforcement. By focusing on structure-induced equilibrium in which taxpayers vote over the size of the income tax and the level of tax enforcement, we show that more inequality may well reduce the extent of redistribution, depending on two opposing effects: the standard political effect and a negative tax base effect working through increases in the average level of tax avoidance and the share of enforcement expenditures in total tax revenue. Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2015 Tax avoidance nationallicence Voting nationallicence Redistribution nationallicence Bethencourt Carlos Departamento de Economía, Universidad de La Laguna, Campus de Guajara s/n, 38071, Tenerife, Spain aut Kunze Lars Department of Economics, TU Dortmund, 44221, Dortmund, Germany aut Public Choice Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 163/3-4(2015-06-01), 267-287 0048-5829 163:3-4<267 2015 163 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0248-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0248-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Bethencourt Carlos Departamento de Economía, Universidad de La Laguna, Campus de Guajara s/n, 38071, Tenerife, Spain aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Kunze Lars Department of Economics, TU Dortmund, 44221, Dortmund, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 163/3-4(2015-06-01), 267-287 0048-5829 163:3-4<267 2015 163 11127