caa a22 4500 606168419 CHVBK 20210128100707.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11127-015-0246-y doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11127-015-0246-y The social contract in the laboratory. An experimental analysis of self-enforcing impartial agreements [Elektronische Daten] [Marco Faillo, Stefania Ottone, Lorenzo Sacconi] Social contract theories are based on the idea of the "consent of the governed,” according to which norms, rules and institutions, constitutions in particular,must be based on the general consensus (or unanimous consent) of the individuals who are subject to the regulation. The article reports the results of an experiment aimed at identifying the conditions for the emergence of a self-enforcing social contract in the laboratory. Our main result is that spontaneous compliance with a non-self-interested norm of distribution is likely to occur if individuals have been part of the same process of ex ante agreement on the distributive norm under a ‘veil of ignorance,' to which the emergence of reciprocal expectations of conformity is also related. This is in line with Rawls's idea of an endogenous ‘sense of justice' stabilizing ex post institutions that would have been ex ante chosen in the original position. Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2015 Social contract nationallicence Social norms nationallicence Distributive justice nationallicence Beliefs elicitation nationallicence Dictator games nationallicence Faillo Marco Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento, Via Inama, 5, 38122, Trento, TN, Italy aut Ottone Stefania Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca, Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1, 20126, Milan, MI, Italy aut Sacconi Lorenzo Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento, Via Inama, 5, 38122, Trento, TN, Italy aut Public Choice Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 163/3-4(2015-06-01), 225-246 0048-5829 163:3-4<225 2015 163 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0246-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0246-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Faillo Marco Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento, Via Inama, 5, 38122, Trento, TN, Italy aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Ottone Stefania Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca, Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1, 20126, Milan, MI, Italy aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Sacconi Lorenzo Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento, Via Inama, 5, 38122, Trento, TN, Italy aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 163/3-4(2015-06-01), 225-246 0048-5829 163:3-4<225 2015 163 11127