caa a22 4500 606168540 CHVBK 20210128100707.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150401xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11127-014-0191-1 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11127-014-0191-1 The value of formalism: re-examining external costs and decision costs with multiple groups [Elektronische Daten] [Keith Dougherty, Julian Edward, Robi Ragan] Several authors have examined the optimal k-majority rule using a variety of criteria. We formalize and extend the original argument laid out by Buchanan and Tullock (The calculus of consent: logical foundations of constitutional democracy, 1962) using a decision theoretic analysis from the perspective of an individual voter. Unlike previous formalizations, voters in our study are members of one or more groups. This allows us to examine cases wherein different voters have starkly different interests. Furthermore, voters in our study can err in their judgments of proposals allowing us to model potential irrationalities in the choice of an optimal k-majority rule. We consider both up or down votes on a single proposal as well as votes over a series of proposals. We find that the optimal k-majority rule depends on a number of parameters, most notably the number of rounds needed to create a proposal that will pass. Group membership has almost no affect. Furthermore, if two groups are at odds, then the external cost function can actually rise over some range of $$k$$ k ; if voters err systematically in their judgment, more inclusive k-majority rules, such as unanimity rule, can fail to pass Pareto preferred proposals. Our results should help advance a classic work in Public Choice. Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2014 k-majority rules nationallicence Constitutional design nationallicence Calculus of consent nationallicence Dougherty Keith Department of Political Science, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA aut Edward Julian Department of Mathematics, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA aut Ragan Robi Department of Economics, San Jose State University, San Jose, CA, USA aut Public Choice Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 163/1-2(2015-04-01), 31-52 0048-5829 163:1-2<31 2015 163 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0191-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-014-0191-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Dougherty Keith Department of Political Science, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Edward Julian Department of Mathematics, Florida International University, Miami, FL, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Ragan Robi Department of Economics, San Jose State University, San Jose, CA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 163/1-2(2015-04-01), 31-52 0048-5829 163:1-2<31 2015 163 11127