caa a22 4500 606168613 CHVBK 20210128100707.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20151001xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11127-015-0297-0 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11127-015-0297-0 Construction corrupts: empirical evidence from a panel of 42 countries [Elektronische Daten] [Andreas Kyriacou, Leonel Muinelo-Gallo, Oriol Roca-Sagalés] The construction sector, whether privately or publicly financed, is characterized by potentially large rents and government intervention making it vulnerable to corruption. Consistent with this, both case-study and survey evidence has been provided highlighting the problem of malfeasance in this sector. In this article, we test the proposition that a bigger construction sector is likely to be inimical to clean government based on a panel of 42 countries over the period 1995-2011. We control for a range of potentially confounding variables and the expectation that corrupt public officials may favor the development of this sector because it increases the volume of rents available to them. Our empirical evidence shows that a larger construction sector will tend to increase perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain. Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2015 Corruption nationallicence Economic sectors nationallicence Construction sector nationallicence Empirical estimates nationallicence Reverse causality nationallicence Kyriacou Andreas Departament d'Economia, Universitat de Girona, Campus de Montilivi, 17071, Girona, Spain aut Muinelo-Gallo Leonel Instituto de Economía de la Universidad de la República, Joaquín Requena 1375, Código Postal 11200, Montevideo, Uruguay aut Roca-Sagalés Oriol Departament d'Economia Aplicada, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Edifici B, Bellaterra, 08193, Barcelona, Spain aut Public Choice Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 165/1-2(2015-10-01), 123-145 0048-5829 165:1-2<123 2015 165 11127 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0297-0 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-015-0297-0 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Kyriacou Andreas Departament d'Economia, Universitat de Girona, Campus de Montilivi, 17071, Girona, Spain aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Muinelo-Gallo Leonel Instituto de Economía de la Universidad de la República, Joaquín Requena 1375, Código Postal 11200, Montevideo, Uruguay aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Roca-Sagalés Oriol Departament d'Economia Aplicada, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Edifici B, Bellaterra, 08193, Barcelona, Spain aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 165/1-2(2015-10-01), 123-145 0048-5829 165:1-2<123 2015 165 11127