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   <subfield code="a">Conceptual framework of market enforcement of environmental regulations: significance and obstacles to the role of markets in policy design</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">This article proposes a specific formulation of the concept of market enforcement. It argues that suffering heavy financial losses in the public markets alone does not constitute effective enforcement if such losses are less than the social costs of associated violations. If the social costs of violations are greater than the private losses to shareholders, then this constitutes an implicit transfer of wealth from the public to stakeholders of the polluting entity. The importance of this formulation is that many policy programs are in part predicated on the assumption of the existence of market enforcement. There are social costs if this premise is faulty. The approach to formulating market enforcement of environmental regulations in this article provides background to a possible development of the theory on optimal market penalties for violations of environmental regulations in the same vein as theories of optimal penalties in law.</subfield>
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