caa a22 4500 606205853 CHVBK 20210128101009.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20151001xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s00034-015-9980-0 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s00034-015-9980-0 Router Attack toward NoC-enabled MPSoC and Monitoring Countermeasures against such Threat [Elektronische Daten] [Arnab Biswas, S. Nandy, Ranjani Narayan] The growing number of applications and processing units in modern Multiprocessor Systems-on-Chips (MPSoCs) come along with reduced time to market. Different IP cores can come from different vendors, and their trust levels are also different, but typically they use Network-on-Chip (NoC) as their communication infrastructure. An MPSoC can have multiple Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). Apart from performance, power, and area research in the field of MPSoC, robust and secure system design is also gaining importance in the research community. To build a secure system, the designer must know beforehand all kinds of attack possibilities for the respective system (MPSoC). In this paper we survey the possible attack scenarios on present-day MPSoCs and investigate a new attack scenario, i.e., router attack targeted toward NoC architecture. We show the validity of this attack by analyzing different present-day NoC architectures and show that they are all vulnerable to this type of attack. By launching a router attack, an attacker can control the whole chip very easily, which makes it a very serious issue. Both routing tables and routing logic-based routers are vulnerable to such attacks. In this paper, we address attacks on routing tables. We propose different monitoring-based countermeasures against routing table-based router attack in an MPSoC having multiple TEEs. Synthesis results show that proposed countermeasures, viz. Runtime-monitor, Restart-monitor, Intermediate manager, and Auditor, occupy areas that are 26.6, 22, 0.2, and 12.2% of a routing table-based router area. Apart from these, we propose Ejection address checker and Local monitoring module inside a router that cause 3.4 and 10.6% increase of a router area, respectively. Simulation results are also given, which shows effectiveness of proposed monitoring-based countermeasures. Springer Science+Business Media New York, 2015 Multiprocessor System-on-Chip security nationallicence Network-on-Chip security nationallicence Hardware security nationallicence Monitoring countermeasure nationallicence Router attack in NoC nationallicence Biswas Arnab CADLAB, Department of Electronic Systems Engineering, Indian Institute of Science, 560012, Bangalore, India aut Nandy S. CADLAB, Supercomputer Education and Research Center, Indian Institute of Science, 560012, Bangalore, India aut Narayan Ranjani Morphing Machines Pvt Ltd, 560055, Bangalore, India aut Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 34/10(2015-10-01), 3241-3290 0278-081X 34:10<3241 2015 34 34 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00034-015-9980-0 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00034-015-9980-0 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Biswas Arnab CADLAB, Department of Electronic Systems Engineering, Indian Institute of Science, 560012, Bangalore, India aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Nandy S. CADLAB, Supercomputer Education and Research Center, Indian Institute of Science, 560012, Bangalore, India aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Narayan Ranjani Morphing Machines Pvt Ltd, 560055, Bangalore, India aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Circuits, Systems, and Signal Processing Springer US; http://www.springer-ny.com 34/10(2015-10-01), 3241-3290 0278-081X 34:10<3241 2015 34 34