caa a22 4500 606210148 CHVBK 20210128101032.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10101-014-0150-9 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10101-014-0150-9 No fight, no loss: underinvestment in experimental contest games [Elektronische Daten] [Sara Godoy, Miguel Meléndez-Jiménez, Antonio Morales] This paper reports a series of laboratory experiments intended to identify conditions that attenuate the overdissipation of rents typical of experimental contest games. We examine the influences on contestant behavior of the observability and timing of preceding bids, allocation rules for the situation when no bids occur (random prize allocation vs. prize loss) and matching protocol for repeated contests involving pairs of bidders. Our results show that the simultaneous presence of three factors (simultaneous bids, random prize allocation if no bids occur and fixed matching) allows contestants to coordinate to realize efficient outcomes (underbidding). However, the absence of one of these factors causes overbidding to return. From the perspective of theoretical prediction, the decision to allocate the prize even when no bids occur (no fight, no loss) should be irrelevant. However, this allocation decision may strongly influence behaviour (by encouraging submission of efficient and minimal bids) if combined with features that encourage collusion (fixed matching and symmetry). Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 Rent seeking nationallicence Conflict nationallicence Experiments nationallicence Prize allocation rule nationallicence Godoy Sara University of Essex, Colchester, UK aut Meléndez-Jiménez Miguel Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Málaga, Plaza El Ejido s/n, 29013, Málaga, Spain aut Morales Antonio Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Málaga, Plaza El Ejido s/n, 29013, Málaga, Spain aut Economics of Governance Springer Berlin Heidelberg 16/1(2015-02-01), 53-72 1435-6104 16:1<53 2015 16 10101 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-014-0150-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-014-0150-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Godoy Sara University of Essex, Colchester, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Meléndez-Jiménez Miguel Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Málaga, Plaza El Ejido s/n, 29013, Málaga, Spain aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Morales Antonio Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad de Málaga, Plaza El Ejido s/n, 29013, Málaga, Spain aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economics of Governance Springer Berlin Heidelberg 16/1(2015-02-01), 53-72 1435-6104 16:1<53 2015 16 10101