caa a22 4500 606210164 CHVBK 20210128101032.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10101-014-0149-2 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10101-014-0149-2 Ono Tetsuo Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, 1-7, Machikaneyama, 560-0043, Toyonaka, Osaka, Japan aut Public education and social security: a political economy approach [Elektronische Daten] [Tetsuo Ono] This study presents an overlapping-generations model with altruism towards children. We characterize a Markov-perfect political equilibrium of voting over two policy issues, public education for the young and social security for the old. The model potentially generates two types of political equilibria, one favoring public education and the other favoring social security. One equilibrium is selected by the government to maximize its objective. It is shown that (i) longevity affects equilibrium selection and relevant policy choices; and (ii) private education as an alternative to public education and a Markov-perfect political equilibrium can generate the two types of equilibria. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2014 Public education nationallicence Social security nationallicence Intergenerational conflict nationallicence Economics of Governance Springer Berlin Heidelberg 16/1(2015-02-01), 1-25 1435-6104 16:1<1 2015 16 10101 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-014-0149-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-014-0149-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Ono Tetsuo Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, 1-7, Machikaneyama, 560-0043, Toyonaka, Osaka, Japan aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economics of Governance Springer Berlin Heidelberg 16/1(2015-02-01), 1-25 1435-6104 16:1<1 2015 16 10101