caa a22 4500 606210199 CHVBK 20210128101032.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150801xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10101-015-0162-0 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10101-015-0162-0 Lskavyan Vahe Ohio University, Athens, OH, USA aut Insider regulation and the incentive to invest as an insider [Elektronische Daten] [Vahe Lskavyan] There is an ongoing debate about the pros and cons of regulating insider transactions. We contribute to this debate by showing that the investor may prefer tougher rather than weaker regulation of his future insider activity. This is because regulation can reduce not only the expected benefits, but also the expected costs of insider status. Tough enough regulation can make the expected cost savings greater than the lost benefits and increase incentives to invest as an insider. Weaker regulation, in contrast, can be worse than no regulation in terms of these incentives. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2015 Insider sales nationallicence Insider regulation nationallicence Investment nationallicence Economics of Governance Springer Berlin Heidelberg 16/3(2015-08-01), 207-227 1435-6104 16:3<207 2015 16 10101 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-015-0162-0 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-015-0162-0 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Lskavyan Vahe Ohio University, Athens, OH, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economics of Governance Springer Berlin Heidelberg 16/3(2015-08-01), 207-227 1435-6104 16:3<207 2015 16 10101