caa a22 4500 606210229 CHVBK 20210128101032.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20151101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10101-015-0171-z doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10101-015-0171-z Political budget cycles in U.S. municipalities [Elektronische Daten] [C. Bee, Shawn Moulton] This paper tests for political budget cycles among U.S. municipalities. According to the political budget cycle hypothesis, in election years government officials engage in opportunistic fiscal policy manipulation for electoral gains. We test that hypothesis using data on taxes, spending, and employment for a panel of 268 U.S. cities over the period 1970-2004. While our estimates provide no evidence of altered total expenditures or taxes in election years, we do find a 0.7% increase in total municipal employment, including increases in police, education, and sanitation employment. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2015 Political budget cycle nationallicence Local fiscal policy nationallicence Bee C. 3519 17th St NE, 20018, Washington, DC, USA aut Moulton Shawn Abt Associates, 55 Wheeler Street, 02138, Cambridge, MA, USA aut Economics of Governance Springer Berlin Heidelberg 16/4(2015-11-01), 379-403 1435-6104 16:4<379 2015 16 10101 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-015-0171-z text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-015-0171-z text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Bee C. 3519 17th St NE, 20018, Washington, DC, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Moulton Shawn Abt Associates, 55 Wheeler Street, 02138, Cambridge, MA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Economics of Governance Springer Berlin Heidelberg 16/4(2015-11-01), 379-403 1435-6104 16:4<379 2015 16 10101