caa a22 4500 606237631 CHVBK 20210128101254.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10677-013-9481-9 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10677-013-9481-9 Situationism versus Situationism [Elektronische Daten] [Travis Rodgers, Brandon Warmke] Most discussions of John Doris's situationism center on what can be called descriptive situationism, the claim that our folk usage of global personality and character traits in describing and predicting human behavior is empirically unsupported. Philosophers have not yet paid much attention to another central claim of situationism, which says that given that local traits are empirically supported, we can more successfully act in line with our moral values if, in our deliberation about what to do, we focus on our situation instead of on our moral character. Call this prescriptive situationism. In this paper, we will point toward a previously unrecognized tension between these two situationist theses and explore some ways for the situationist to address it. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2013 Virtue Ethics nationallicence John Doris nationallicence Situationism nationallicence Character nationallicence Virtue nationallicence Rodgers Travis University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA aut Warmke Brandon University of Arizona, Phoenix, AZ, USA aut Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Springer Netherlands 18/1(2015-02-01), 9-26 1386-2820 18:1<9 2015 18 10677 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9481-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9481-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Rodgers Travis University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Warmke Brandon University of Arizona, Phoenix, AZ, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Springer Netherlands 18/1(2015-02-01), 9-26 1386-2820 18:1<9 2015 18 10677