caa a22 4500 606237798 CHVBK 20210128101255.0 cr unu---uuuuu 210128e20150601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10677-014-9541-9 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10677-014-9541-9 Moehler Michael Department of Philosophy (0126), Virginia Tech, 229 Major Williams Hall, 24061, Blacksburg, VA, USA aut Rational Cooperation and the Nash Bargaining Solution [Elektronische Daten] [Michael Moehler] In a recent article, McClennen (Synthese 187:65-93, 2012) defends an alternative bargaining theory in response to his criticisms of the standard Nash bargaining solution as a principle of distributive justice in the context of the social contract. McClennen rejects the orthodox concept of expected individual utility maximizing behavior that underlies the Nash bargaining model in favor of what he calls full rationality, and McClennen's full cooperation bargaining theory demands that agents select the most egalitarian strictly Pareto-optimal distributional outcome that is strictly Pareto-superior to the state of nature. I argue that McClennen's full cooperators are best described as reasonable agents whose rationality is constrained by moral considerations and that McClennen's bargaining theory is moralized in this regard. If, by contrast, the orthodox concept of rationality is assumed and plausible assumptions are made about human nature and social cooperation, then a modified version of the standard Nash bargaining solution, which I call the stabilized Nash bargaining solution (Moehler in Utilitas 22:447-473, 2010), is justified. From the perspective of rational agents, the stabilized Nash bargaining solution can accommodate McClennen's criticisms of the standard Nash bargaining solution in the context of the social contract and, for such agents, it can serve as a principle of distributive justice in deeply morally pluralistic societies. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, 2014 Full rationality nationallicence Reasonableness nationallicence Equality nationallicence Instrumental rationality nationallicence (Strict) Pareto-optimality nationallicence (Stabilized) Nash bargaining solution nationallicence Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Springer Netherlands 18/3(2015-06-01), 577-594 1386-2820 18:3<577 2015 18 10677 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9541-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-014-9541-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Moehler Michael Department of Philosophy (0126), Virginia Tech, 229 Major Williams Hall, 24061, Blacksburg, VA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Ethical Theory and Moral Practice Springer Netherlands 18/3(2015-06-01), 577-594 1386-2820 18:3<577 2015 18 10677